Ingushetian instablity and the “Russian Phobia”
So, this week’s been interesting - crowdsourcing, defecting Tory MPs, and now … incisive and seriously lengthy political analysis of the Russian Federation? Right. Of course. What else would you be expecting?
For me, the roots of this tale go back to the summer of 2007 when, for a university course on International Political Economy, I was focusing on theories of ‘the offshore economy’ (of which, more later) and the post-Soviet transition. After some brainstorming, these two themes converged in an essay on the economic peculiarities of Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast.
Devouring Chrystia Freeland’s Sale of the Century - a fascinating little book, which grappled with some really dry subject matter in a manner similar to that of literary non-fiction - I turned to the Republic of Ingushetia as an illustrative example; a point of contrast for my analysis of Kaliningrad’s political economy.
From the essay;
… Ingushetia was afforded ‘ofshornaya zona’ status by a presidential decree in 1994. Considering the 1990s saw $10-$20bn of capital flight per annum, ‘leaching away much-needed domestic investment and infuriating foreign aid donors’, the creation of an ‘offshore’ zone would appear to be one of the last things that the Kremlin would have wanted. From this, it is logical to assume that the Kremlin must have been convinced of the need for such a zone by someone who would have benefited. In the Russian context, this proves somewhat problematic, as the significant level of capital flight suggests that those who would have normally taken advantage of such facilities – in this case, the Russian oligarchs – were already making use of ‘offshore’ zones, external to the Russian state. We cannot even attribute such a move to the smaller, less overtly hegemonic business interests, as their enthusiasm for ‘offshore’ had, to a significant degree, been pre-empted by the existence of Russia’s institutionalised ‘grey economy’. Indeed, the fact that nobody had previously pushed for a bifurcation of sovereignty within ‘mainland’ Russia suggests that 1994 must have represented some kind of fundamental discontinuity …




